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COMMENTS
THE PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT IN THE
CRIMINAL TRIAL: ARE
BIFURCATION AND THE RULES
CONCERNING OPINION
TESTIMONY ON ULTIMATE ISSUES
CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPATIBLE?
INTRODUCTION
Evidentiary rules and court decisions have attempted to
rationalize and crystalize legal issues. The desire to minimize
confusion and further justice has been the impetus to these
endeavors. One confusion-causing factor has been the use of
psychiatric expert testimony in the criminal trial. Courts and
legislatures have raised doubts concerning the scientific valid-
ity of psychiatry. Evidentiary rules and court decisions have
therefore imposed restrictions upon the admissibility of psy-
chiatric expert testimony. The difficulty arises when specific
intent and insanity are key issues in a criminal trial. Each
issue deals with a state of mind or a mental purpose, and psy-
chiatry is the science that deals most closely with these issues.
This Comment deals chiefly with specific intent crimes. It
will be helpful to keep an example in mind while reading.
Wisconsin defines first-degree murder as an act in which one
"causes the death of another human being.with intent to kill
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that person or another."' Intent to kill means the "mental
purpose to take the life of another human being."2
The basic scope of this Comment is the bifurcated trial
system and the use of a psychiatrist's opinion on ultimate is-
sues within that system. There is a discussion of Federal Rule
of Evidence 7043 and state statutes and case law which emu-
late its recent revision. The Comment also addresses the con-
stitutionality of bifurcation, psychiatric expert opinion
testimony, and the operational nexus between these concepts.
The Comment concludes with some proposals that attempt to
alleviate confusion and make their function more constitution-
ally acceptable.
The aim of this Comment is not to delve deeply into the
present state of the insanity defense nor to discuss the various
theories on insanity. Its chief goal is to provide some insight
into the procedural and evidentiary devices which surround
the bifurcated trial and highlight the value of psychiatric ex-
pert testimony.
I. THE BIFURCATED TRIAL SYSTEM
It has been stated that "[b]ifurcation is nothing more than
a procedural device, analytically a pure form without substan-
tive impact and value free in terms of whether it is 'pro prose-
cution' or 'pro defense.' "I The United States Supreme Court
has noted that two-part jury trials are uncommon in federal
jurisprudence being neither constitutionally nor procedurally
1. Wis. STAT. § 940.01(1) (1985-86). Section 940.01(1) provides as follows:
"Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or
another is guilty of a Class A felony." Id. A "Class A" felony carries a penalty of life
imprisonment. See Wis. STAT. § 939.50(3)(a) (1985-86). In contrast, the Model Penal
Code defines murder as follows: "[Criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (a) it
is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly under circum-
stances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life .... MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 210.2(1) (1962).
2. Wis. STAT. § 940.01(2) (1985-86). Section 940.01(2) provides: "In this chapter
'intent to kill' means the mental purpose to take the life of another human being." Id.
See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). Section 2.02 of the Model Penal
Code defines "purposefully," "knowingly" and "recklessly" as they are used in relation
to culpability.
3. See infra note 86.
4. Gallivan, Insanity, Bifurcation and Due Process: Can Values Survive Doctrine,
13 LAND & WATER L. REv. 515, 518 (1978).
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mandated.5 Yet several states have provided for such proce-
dural devices for many years. In State ex rel. La Follette v.
Raskin 6 the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressed bifurcation
in this manner:
While some cases refer to a "bifurcated trial," "split trial,"
"two-part trial," or a "trial with a sequential order of proof"
indiscriminately, such terms are not necessarily synony-
mous. A bifurcated trial or a split trial, as opposed to a uni-
tary trial, sometimes means complete separate trials before
the same or different juries resulting in partial determina-
tions of the controversy. While they are not common they
are not unknown in the law.'
Simply stated, bifurcation is the separation of the issues of
guilt and insanity into two distinct proceedings.
A. The State Approach
During the late 1800's, the Wisconsin legislature passed a
law which provided for insanity and guilt issues to be tried
separately and in that order." The Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld the statute as not constitutionally violative, saying that
it was "the most practical and convenient method of disposing
of the whole case." 9 However, in 1911 the legislature repealed
bifurcation' ° and not until 1967 were the issues of insanity and
guilt tried separately."1 Section 971.175 of the Wisconsin Stat-
5. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 568 (1967).
6. 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967).
7. Id. at 614-15, 150 N.W.2d at 322.
8. Wis. RFv. STAT. ch. 191, §§ 4697-99 (1878); see also MacBain, The Insanity
Defense: Conceptual Confusion and the Erosion of Fairness, 67 MARQ. L. RnV. 1, 25
(1983). Professor MacBain's article will be used throughout this Comment. Contained
therein is an in-depth look at the present state of the insanity defense in Wisconsin. His
conclusion differs from the conclusion offered by this article, but much of Professor
MacBain's analysis will shed light on this area of the law for the reader.
9. Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 78, 14 N.W. 912, 916 (1883).
10. Act of May 31, 1911, ch. 221, § 1, 1911 Wis. Laws 225-26; see also MacBain,
supra note 8, at 25 n.140.
11. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318.
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:493
utes 12 is a codification of Raskin which calls for a sequential
order of proof.13
California and Colorado each have some form of a bifur-
cated trial system. The California system 14 was added to the
statutes in 1927 and, although amended throughout the ensu-
ing years, has had judicial support with a liberal interpretation
of the legislature's intent.15 Colorado's bifurcated trial stat-
12. Wis. STAT. § 971.175 (1985-86) provides:
Sequential order of proof.
When a defendant couples a plea of not guilty with a plea of not guilty by reason
of mental disease or defect, there shall be a separation of the issues with a se-
quential order of proof before the same jury in a continuous trial. The guilt issue
shall be heard first and then the issue of the defendant's mental responsibility.
The jury shall be informed of the 2 pleas and that a verdict will be taken upon
the plea of not guilty before the introduction of evidence on the plea of not guilty
by reason of mental disease or defect. This section does not apply to cases tried
before the court without a jury.
13. A sequential order of proof is merely another way of stating a separation of
issues with certain procedural and evidentiary rules applying to each issue. Section
971.175 requires the guilt issue to be heard first. At that time, the elements of the crime
charged are addressed; the presence of any mental disease or defect is irrelevant and
evidence thereto is inadmissible. The issue of any mental abnormality is addressed in
the second phase after a guilty verdict is returned in the first phase. The proof of mental
disease or defect continues with submission of evidence to the same jury which ad-
dressed the guilt issue. The order of submission of evidence moves in sequence with the
order in which the issues are addressed. See supra note 12 for the full text of Wis. STAT.
§ 971.175 (1985-86). See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 73 (1981) for a
discussion of the procedure in split trial systems.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a) (West 1986). Section 1026(a) provides in part:
Pleas of insanity; separate trials; presumption of sanity; trial of sanity issue; ver-
dict; ...
(a) When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, and also joins
with it another plea or pleas, the defendant shall first be tried as if only such
other plea or pleas had been entered, and in that trial the defendant shall be
conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time the offense is alleged to have
been committed. If the jury shall find the defendant guilty, or if the defendant
pleads only not guilty by reason of insanity, then the question whether the de-
fendant was sane or insane at the time the offense was committed shall be
promptly tried, either before the same jury or before a new jury in the discretion
of the court. In that trial, the jury shall return a verdict either that the defendant
was sane at the time the offense was committed or' was insane at the time the
offense was committed. ...
Id. As to the admission of evidence concerning conclusive presumptions, see infra note
137.
15. See Gallivan, supra note 4, at 532-35. At the time of the enactment of Califor-
nia's bifurcated trial system the Penal Code also provided that lunatics and insane per-
sons were not capable of committing crimes. Id. at 533 n.71. In combination with the
evidentiary restriction this section was in clear violation of due process by denying the
defendant the opportunity to enter evidence on the defense of insanity. People v. Wells,
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ute16 had been in force prior to the 1983 enactment which ex-
pressed a clear intent to separate the issues of insanity and
guilt. 17 Its goal was to eliminate many constitutional chal-
lenges when the issues of insanity and guilt were addressed in
a unitary trial.1 8  States such as Arizona and Wyoming have
had bifurcated trial systems. Both the Arizona Supreme
Court1 9 and the Wyoming Supreme Court20 have held their
respective procedures to be constitutionally deficient as to due
process.21
The procedure of a bifurcated system is jurisdictional.
This Comment's main focus will be on Wisconsin, but the ap-
proach other states follow will serve as a point of contrast and
criticism. In order to activate Wisconsin's bifurcated system
the defendant must "couple[s] a plea of not guilty with a plea
of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect."'22 A con-
tinuous trial will ensue wherein a sequential order of proof2 3
33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949), is an example of the court's liberal interpretation of
the statutes. The court was able to avoid constitutionality problems by slightly side-
stepping the legislative intent and interpreting the procedural aspect in a more constitu-
tional framework. See Gallivan, supra note 4, at 532-35; see also Louisell & Hazard,
Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 805, 816-22 (1961).
16. CoLo. RFv. STAT. § 16-8-104 (1985). Section 16-8-104 provides as follows:
"Separate trial of issues. The issues raised by the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
shall be tried separately to different juries, and the sanity of the defendant shall be tried
first." Id.; see also Louisell & Hazard, supra note 15, at 824-26 (discussion of Colo-
rado's bifurcated system and its judicial and legislative treatment).
17. See People v. King, 181 Colo. 489, 510 P.2d 333 (1973).
18. Lewis v. Thulemeyer, 189 Colo. 139, -, 538 P.2d 441, 443 (1975).
19. See State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970); see also Gallivan, supra
note 4, at 530.
20. See Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977); see also Gallivan, supra note 4,
at 538-42.
21. In Shaw, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the controlling statutes, one
providing for bifurcation without admission of evidence of insanity in the guilt phase,
and the other statute which called for intent, as an element of a crime, to be possessed or
manifested by a person with a sound mind. Shaw, 106 Ariz. at _ 471 P.2d at 721.
The court found the restrictive evidentiary rule to be violative of due process by not
allowing the defense to enter evidence and by relieving the State of proving an element
of the crime charged. Id.; see also Gallivan, supra note 4, at 529-31. In Sanchez, the
Wyoming Supreme Court struck down that state's bifurcation statute because it did not
offer the defendant an opportunity to present a defense to the element of intent. The
rebuttable presumption of intent became irrebuttable in violation of the defendant's
right to due process. Sanchez, 567 P.2d at 279; see also Gallivan, supra note 4, at 538-
42.
22. Wis. STAT. § 971.175 (1985-86). See supra note 12 for the full text of the
statute.
23. See supra note 13.
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will be heard, first upon the guilt issue and then upon the
mental responsibility issue. The jury, having knowledge of
both pleas, will render a verdict upon the guilt issue first. The
admission of evidence concerning the plea of not guilty by rea-
son of mental disease or defect is not permitted until and un-
less the jury returns a guilty verdict on the first issue. It
should be remembered that the state must prove all elements
of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt as required
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.24
In contrast, the California system2 5 calls for separate tri-
als. The defendant must join a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity with another plea to the crime charged. The first trial
will be on the crime charged and during that trial the accused
will be conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time
the offense was committed. Upon a guilty verdict, the issue of
insanity will be resolved by a second trial.
In Colorado the single plea of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity includes the pleas of not guilty to the crime charged.26
However, in that state the issue of insanity is tried first to a
separate jury.27 Upon a finding that the accused was sane at
the time that the alleged crime was to have occurred, the
24. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Section 1.12(1) of the Model Penal
Code sets forth that "[n]o person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of
such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the
innocence of the defendant is assumed." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (1962). This
is an accurate interpretation of the often misunderstood concept of "presumption of
innocence." Presumption of innocence is technically not a presumption, but merely an
alternative phrasing of the government's burden of proving each element beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
25. See supra note 14.
26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-103(1) (1986) provides:
Pleading insanity as a defense.
(1) The defense of insanity may only be raised by a specific plea entered at the
time of arraignment; except that thecourt, for good cause shown, may permit the
plea to be entered at any time prior to trial. The form of the plea shall be: "Not
guilty by reason of insanity"; and it must be pleaded orally either by the defend-
ant or by his counsel. A defendant who does not raise the defense as provided in
this section shall not be permitted to rely upon insanity as a defense to the crime
charged, but, when charged with a crime requiring a specific intent as an element
thereof, may introduce evidence of his mental condition as bearing upon his ca-
pacity to form the required specific intent. The plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity includes the plea of not guilty.
27. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-104 (1985). See supra note 16 for the text of the
statute.
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court will "set the case for trial on the issues raised by the plea
of not guilty. '28
B. Reasons for Bifurcation Legislation
The impetus for enactment of bifurcation legislation is the
existence of evidentiary problems. The controversy surround-
ing expert testimony29 when the mental state of the accused is
in question has led to the development of these procedural de-
vices. In calling for a bifurcated trial, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has noted that several problems could be eliminated.
"[P]roblems which usually occur during examination and
cross-examination of the expert witness concerning the basis
of his opinion" 30 would be avoided. Because the issue of guilt
is not present, "the procedure which invites the improper use
of evidence for its collateral effect is eliminated. ' 31 In refer-
ence to the California procedure, a commentator noted that
such legislation was "[o]riginally introduced to reduce the
possibility of confusing and sidetracking the jury with the psy-
chiatric testimony necessitated by the insanity defense." 32
Protection of the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination 33 offers another advantage since the
defendant's comments at the psychiatric examination cannot
be offered into evidence at the guilt phase.34
28. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-105(3) (1985).
29. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. See generally Ladd, Expert Testi-
mony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414 (1951-52).
30. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d at 626, 150 N.W.2d at 328; see supra note 13 and accompa-
nying text.
31. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d at 626, 150 N.W.2d at 328.
32. Comment, Psychiatry v. Law in the Pre-Trial Mental Examination: The Bifur-
cated Trial and Other Alternatives, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 827, 848 (1971-72).
33. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentation of indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor to be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. See Comment, supra note 32, at 849; see also Wis. STAT. § 971.18 (1985-86).
Section 971.18 provides a statutory restriction on the admissibility of statements made
for the purposes of examination.
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C. The Psychiatrist's Role in the Bifurcated Trial System
It would seem evident that the psychiatric expert's role in
the criminal trial is critical and yet controversial. Between
evidentiary and procedural rules this role has been severely
limited. Conceivably each phase of a bifurcated trial could
have psychiatric involvement. Dealing initially with Wiscon-
sin, the psychiatric expert could offer testimony on matters of
criminal intent or responsibility in the guilt phase.35 How-
ever, in Steele v. State,36 the Wisconsin Supreme Court ex-
cluded from the guilt phase of the trial "expert opinion
testimony tending to prove or disprove the defendant's capac-
ity to form the requisite criminal intent. ' 37 The court held the
testimony to be incompetent, irrelevant and nonprobative. 38
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that "in Wisconsin psychiatric testimony is rele-
vant evidence on issues regarding a defendant's mental state
including the question of whether the defendant had the ca-
pacity to form specific as opposed to general intent. ' 39 The
court also found psychiatric testimony to be competent.40
This disagreement between the Wisconsin Supreme Court and
the Seventh Circuit has fueled a controversy and general defi-
ance by each court of the other's view concerning this area.
The second phase of the bifurcated trial system in Wiscon-
sin entails the adjudication of insanity issues. It is the role of
the psychiatrist to attempt to define or classify the particular
mental disease or defect, or to determine if there is one at all,
and then to inform the trier of fact.
A third phase may be necessary in particular instances. In
such a "trifurcated" system the psychiatrist could examine the
defendant and testify as to future dangerousness or testify as
35. See generally Comment, Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony in the Guilt
Phase of Bifurcated Trials: What's Left After the Reforms of the Diminished Capacity
Defense?, 16 PAc. L.J. 305 (1984-85).
36. 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).
37. Id. at 98, 294 N.W.2d at 14.
38. Id. at 97, 294 N.W.2d at 13.
39. Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1978). Although the
Hughes decision was prior to the Steele holding, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning is judi-
cially honest and sound, and, in light of this Comment, more constitutionally
acceptable.
40. Id. at 1258.
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to the proper disposition of an adjudicated insane defendant.41
The third phase is generally where the disposition of one who
is adjudged insane is determined.
D. Challenges of the Bifurcated Trial System
The basis of most challenges of the bifurcated trial system
has been on due process grounds.42 Due process concerns
have been used "both to demand and to condemn the proce-
dure. ' 43 The basic objection deals with the handling of the
intent issue when it is an essential element of the crime
charged.
In most criminal charges, intent is an essential element of
guilt; since insanity is held to negate this requisite intent, the
defendant cannot be found guilty if insane. Therefore, the
exclusion of the insanity plea as a defense in the first segment
[phase] of a bifurcated trial may be seen as a denial of the
right to disprove a material element of the crime.'
In Wisconsin the defendant is presumed to be sane at the time
the alleged act was to have been committed.4 5 This presump-
tion holds true for the guilt phase. It is a rebuttable presump-
tion but the restrictions on the admissibility of evidence make
the rebuttable aspect suspect. This will be more fully devel-
oped below.46
41. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has overruled its previous holding which re-
quired a third phase to be added to the proceeding to determine whether a defendant
found "not responsible" is "presently suffering from mental illness and is in need of
institutionalized treatment." See State v. Field, 118 Wis. 2d 269, 347 N.W.2d 365
(1984) (overruling State ex rel. Kovach v. Schubert, 64 Wis. 2d 612, 219 N.W.2d 341
(1974)); Introductory Comment, Wis. Jury Instruction-Criminal 601-62 (1985). How-
ever, an adjudicated insane individual is entitled to some treatment of his illness. See
generally H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE ch. 9, § 4
(1954); Kozol, Dangerousness in Society and Law, 13 U. TOL. L. REv. 241 (1981-82);
Comment, Punishment Versus Treatment of the Guilty But Mentally 1ll, 74 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 428 (1983).
42. See generally Annotation, Necessity or Propriety of Bifurcated Criminal Trial on
Issue of Insanity Defense, 1 A.L.R. 4th 884 (1980). This annotation discusses the neces-
sity and propriety of the bifurcated criminal trial, providing views for and against such a
system. Several constitutional challenges from various jurisdictions are highlighted.
43. Comment, Due Process and Bifurcated Trials: A Double-Edged Sword, 66 Nw.
U.L. REv. 327 (1971-72).
44. Id. at 328-29 and accompanying footnotes.
45. State v. Schweider, 5 Wis. 2d 627, 94 N.W.2d 154 (1959).
46. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text; see also supra note 21.
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In California the defendant is conclusively presumed to be
sane at the time the alleged act was to have been committed. 7
In Colorado the insanity issue is resolved first. If there is a
second phase (the second phase being guilt determination), the
trier of fact has already found the defendant to be sane so no
presumption will arise.
Proponents of the bifurcated trial argue that such a system
is needed to guarantee both procedural and substantive due
process rights.4 They contend that the pure controversial na-
ture of psychiatric testimony gives rise to the protections af-
forded by such a system. The prejudicial effect that the
collateral use of expert testimony could create warrants such
protections.49
II. PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
Psychiatric testimony has been shown to be an important
factor in the criminal trial. In reviewing state statutes and
court decisions the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized "that when the State has made the defendant's mental
condition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the pun-
ishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may
well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his de-
fense." 50 The defendant's mental state can become an issue in
several stages of a criminal proceeding. The evidence prof-
fered by a psychiatrist in these stages is invaluable. Because
the need for psychiatric assistance and testimony is so
profound, it has gained constitutional support and has consti-
tutional underpinnings.
A. Constitutional Concerns
The concept of fundamental fairness5I encompasses evi-
dentiary considerations:
47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a) (1986). See supra note 14 for the text of the
statute.
48. See Comment, supra note 43, at 329.
49. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
50. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80 (1985).
51. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968). The Court discussed
the concept of fundamental fairness extending from rights in the fifth and sixth amend-
ments, as they pertain to criminal proceedings, and applied to the state via the four-
teenth amendment. The Court noted that the concept was phrased in a number of
[Vol. 70:493
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The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel
their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to
present a defense, the right to present the defendant's ver-
sion of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it
may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the
right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose
of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his
own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a funda-
mental element of due process of law.52
Where a rule of law, be it a substantive or procedural rule,
deprives the defendant of a witness or her testimony, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment is violated. 3 An
essential ingredient to a fair trial is the right to offer
testimony. 4
The Court in In re Winship 55 explicitly held "that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.15 6 For the
crime of first-degree murder the specific intent to kill is an
element that must be proven under this burden of proof.5 7 In-
ways, basically, "whether a right is among those 'fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions'; and whether it is
'basic in our system of jurisprudence'; and whether it is 'a fundamental right, essential
to a fair trial."' Id. (citations omitted).
52. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
53. See generally Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
54. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
55. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
56. Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
57. As far back as 1897, the United States Supreme Court has held that the prose-
cution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis v. United States, 165 U.S.
373, 378 (1897). Where specific intent is an element of the crime charged the prosecu-
tion must prove that element beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
However, when the State makes insanity an affirmative defense, the defendant must
prove his insanity by some lesser quantum of proof; on the federal level, by clear and
convincing evidence. It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court in Le-
land v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), held that a state was permitted to require a defend-
ant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was insane if he makes that defense an
issue. The Court did not see this burden of proof as "violat[ing] generally accepted
concepts of basic standards of justice." Leland, 343 U.S. at 799. But see United States
v. Voice, 627 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1980), where the court held that the presumption of
sanity is dispelled when evidence of insanity is entered; this subjects the prosecution to
prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Voice, 627 F.2d at 148; see also United States
v. Samuels, 801 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (8th Cir. 1986); 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984). See infra
note 88 for the text of Section 20.
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tent is a state of mind.5 8 Professional interpretation of that
state of mind can be helpful to both the defense and the prose-
cution. The prosecution may need a psychiatric expert to of-
fer proof of this state of mind; the defense to rebut the state's
expert witness and to establish a defense through the proof of
insanity. To deprive either party of this expert, whether it be
assistance or testimony of the expert, would cause a deficiency
that does not meet constitutional requirements: the prosecu-
tion's need to meet the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
and the defense's right to present witnesses to establish a
defense.
In Ake v. Oklahoma- 9 the United States Supreme Court
constitutionally guaranteed a psychiatrist for an indigent de-
fendant.6" The Court, in describing the role of the psychia-
trist, said:
[P]sychiatrists gather facts, both through professional exam-
ination, interviews, and elsewhere, that they will share with
the judge or jury; they analyze the information gathered and
from it draw plausible conclusions about the defendant's
mental condition, and about the effects of any disorder on
behavior; and they offer opinions about how the defendant's
mental condition might have affected his behavior at the
time in question.61
It is arguable from this statement that the Supreme Court
views psychiatric testimony concerning the defendant's
mental state at the time of the alleged commission to be valua-
ble evidence. The Court also states that through investigation,
interpretation, and testimony, the psychiatrist can assist the
58. In Wisconsin, the intent to kill is defined as "the mental purpose to take the life
of another human being." WIs. STAT. § 940.01(2) (1985-86). The Model Penal Code
defines "purposely" as a "conscious objective" and "knowingly" as the accused being
"aware" of his conduct. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962). It is a logical connec-
tion between intent and the particular mentality of the accused, whether it be termed as
"consciousness," "awareness," or "mental purpose." Intent determination requires an
examination of mental faculties at the particular time. The state of mind is key to intent
determination. See generally Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony as to
Whether Accused Had Specific Intent Necessary for Conviction, 16 A.L.R.4th 666
(1982).
59. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
60. For a comprehensive discussion on the indigent defendant's constitutional right
to a psychiatric expert, see Note, An Indigent Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Right
to a Psychiatric Expert, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 481; see also Note, infra note 79.
61. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80 (1985).
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lay juror in making an informed determination. 2 The mere
fact that both state and federal legislatures have enacted pro-
cedural rules and substantive law concerning the psychiatrist's
role in the criminal justice system also suggests the impor-
tance of this issue.6 3 The use of psychiatric testimony in vari-
ous stages of a criminal proceeding exhibits the degree of
reliability the judicial system places upon such evidence.
B. General Admissibility of Psychiatric Expert Testimony
The main concerns with psychiatric expert testimony are
relevancy, competency, probative value, and state justifica-
tions for limiting the admission of the evidence. The proffered
evidence in Steele v. State was excluded as neither relevant,
competent nor probative. In Hughes v. Mathews,65 the court
"recognized the due process right of the defendant to present
relevant and competent evidence in the absence of a valid state
justification for excluding such evidence." '66
1. Relevancy
Relevant evidence is both material and probative.6 7 Rele-
vant evidence is evidence having the tendency to establish a
fact in consequence. A fact in consequence includes facts
which comprise direct evidence of an element of a claim or
defense, facts from whose establishment may be inferred facts
amounting to elements of claims or defenses, and facts bearing
circumstantially upon the evaluation of the probative value
given to other evidence in the case.68 When the mental state
of an accused is an element of the crime charged it can be
assumed that psychiatric testimony would have a tendency to
62. Id. at 80-81.
63. See id. at 78-79 n.4; see also Lewin, Mental Disorder and the Federal Indigent,
11 S.D.L. REV. 198 (1966) (an in-depth look at the devices under the federal system for
the indigent criminal defendant to obtain psychiatric assistance).
64. 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).
65. 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1978).
66. Id. at 1259.
67. See FED. R. EVID. 401. Rule 401, identical to Wis. STAT. § 904.01 (1985-86),
provides: "Definition of 'Relevant Evidence': 'Relevant evidence' means evidence hav-
ing any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
68. M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 401.1 (2d ed. 1986).
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establish that element. Psychiatric testimony from both par-
ties will enable the jury to make the most accurate determina-
tion of the issues before it.69  Where the crime charged
mandates proof of a specific intent, first-degree murder as an
example, the state must go forward with evidence to prove
this intent beyond a reasonable doubt.7" Providing the jury
with the evidence relevant to resolving this issue is a major
goal of procedural rules.
2. Competency
The competency of the psychiatric testimony is the next
issue. If scientific or specialized knowledge will aid the trier
of fact to determine a fact in issue and if the witness is prop-
erly qualified as an expert by his or her knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training, or education, then that witness may testify as
to that issue.71 The question of competency of the evidence
may also bear heavily upon the trustworthiness of psychiatric
testimony. In Hughes v. Mathews,72 the court addressed this
by pointing out Wisconsin's extensive use of psychiatric testi-
mony. This evidence is admitted in the second phase of the
bifurcated trial where the chief issue is insanity. Expert testi-
mony is also used in civil commitment proceedings and in
competency hearings to determine capacity to stand trial. The
Steele v. State73 court could not agree with this contention,
seeing the Hughes court as "bootstrapping" its conclusion. If
the evidence embraces a fact in issue, if the psychiatric expert
witness is properly qualified, and if the testimony is viewed as
trustworthy, the evidence should be viewed as competent.
69. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 81.
70. See generally United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1977).
71. See FED. R. EvID. 702. Rule 702, identical to Wis. STAT. § 907.02 (1985-86),
provides:
Testimony by Experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
See generally C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 13, 61-71 (E. Cleary 3d
ed. 1984).
72. 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1978).
73. 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).
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Application of the test laid out in Frye v. United States,74 or an
offer of proof that satisfies the court, or the pure credibility of
the witness and the nature of her examination and procedures,
may help establish trustworthiness.
3. Probative Value
The next issue raised is whether the probative value of psy-
chiatric testimony is significantly outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.7 If the prejudice, confusion, or risk of misleading the
jury outweighs the probative value of the psychiatric testi-
mony, then the testimony is not admissible even though it
may be relevant evidence. It is conceded that the potential
dangers of psychiatric testimony could be significant. How-
ever, it would be more acceptable to control the admission of
the evidence and provide proper jury instructions than to ex-
clude the evidence entirely. The probative value of this evi-
dence is also significant when it embraces an element of the
crime and has an educating effect on the trier of fact.
4. Justifications for Exclusions
The last issue to consider is the legitimacy of a state's justi-
fication for excluding this evidence. The right to present rele-
vant and competent evidence is not absolute. The right may
"bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the crimi-
nal trial process."76 Any proffered justification must come
under strict scrutiny. The Hughes court addressed two justifi-
cations for excluding psychiatric testimony on the issue of in-
74. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The test set out in Frye is applied to determine
admissibility of a scientific principle or discovery. If the principle or discovery has
gained acceptability in the particular field in which it belongs, then it is admissible. Id.
at 1014; see also Comment, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: The Current
State of the Frye Test in Wisconsin, 69 MARQ. L. REv. 116 (1985-86).
75. FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403, identical to Wis. STAT. § 904.03 (1985-86),
provides:
Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste
of Time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
76. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
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tent offered by the State of Wisconsin.77 The first fear was
that guilty people who were legally sane would be found to be
criminally irresponsible because psychiatric testimony con-
vinced the trier of fact that there was no specific intent for
first-degree murder. This argument ignores the lesser in-
cluded offense of second-degree murder and makes hasty as-
sumptions as to the guilt and sanity of the accused. The
second fear was that the admission of such testimony on in-
tent would undermine the integrity of Wisconsin's bifurcated
trial system. Within this concern is the desire not to duplicate
evidence. This concern is valid, but when the exclusion of
psychiatric testimony is taken to the extreme, as in Steele,78
the integrity of the bifurcated trial system is marred rather
than protected. The exclusion of evidence that would shed
light on an essential element of a crime or a core element of an
affirmative defense does not further the goals of a bifurcated
system.
Many positions have stood as justifications for excluding
otherwise relevant and competent psychiatric expert testi-
mony. As the United States Supreme Court has observed,
"[p]sychiatry is not, however, an exact science, and psychia-
trists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes
mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to
given behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on
likelihood of future dangerousness."7 9 Due to the varying
schools of thought within the community of psychiatrists,
there is bound to be disagreement. Professor Bernard L. Dia-
mond of the University of California, Berkeley, contends that
the growth in confusion in the psychiatric profession has re-
sulted greatly from the increase in knowledge about mental
illness.80 He predicts that "the evidentiary value of psychiat-
77. Hughes, 576 F.2d at 1258-59.
78. Steele, 97 Wis. 2d at 72, 294 N.W.2d at 2.
79. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81. For a detailed discussion of Ake, see generally Note, The
Indigent Defendant's Right to Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087
(1985), 17 N.C.C.L.J. - (1987).
80. Diamond, From Durham to Brawner, A Futile Journey, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q.
109, 115. In United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court ex-
amined various criteria for insanity and the testimony related to those criteria. Brawner
"permits the introduction of expert testimony as to abnormal condition if it is relevant




ric testimony will become less, rather than more, credible in
the coming decades.""' Dr. Frederick A. Fosdal quotes a
noted Wisconsin law professor, saying "[i]n general, it is not
at all apparent that psychiatrists know any more than does the
layman about whether the defendant had an intent to kill
when the act causing death was committed.
82
However, Dr. Fosdal concludes that "the proper role of
the psychiatrist on the issue of intent [is] to be the provider of
relevant clinical data about the defendant, the background
and circumstances of the offense, and a discussion of the fac-
tors that caused or allowed the offense to take place."'8 3 In
Ake, the Court stated that "[p]erhaps because there often is no
single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity in a
given case, juries remain the primary factfinders on this issue,
and they must resolve differences in opinion within the psychi-
atric profession on the basis of the evidence offered by each
party."18 4 An informed jury is better than an uninformed one.
Jurors receiving expert testimony from both parties are more
informed than those without the benefit of such testimony.
Educating jurors with this testimony will make them better
able to address and determine the issues before them.
Ill. EXPERT OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUES
The bifurcated trial system has ingrained within it the psy-
chiatric profession. The jurisdictions that have recognized the
value of this system have a special duty to ensure the proper
role of the psychiatric expert within that system. This role of
the expert has been severely limited through legislative enact-
ments and judicial decisions. The latest enactment on the fed-
eral level deals with expert opinion on ultimate issues. Given
that the federal courts do not operate under a bifurcated trial
system, the new Federal Rule of Evidence 70485 will not have
as great an impact as it would in state "bifurcated trial" juris-
81. Diamond, supra note 80, at 115.
82. Fosdal, Diminished Capacity, Intent and Psychiatric Testimony, 52 Wis. B.
BULL., Apr. 1979, at 23 n.24.
83. Id. at 24.
84. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81.
85. FED. R. EvID. 704, amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, § 406, 98 Stat. 2067, (1984). For the full text of Rule
704, see infra note 86.
1987]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
dictions. The fear is that these states will adopt this amend-
ment to Rule 704.
A. Recent Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 704
The rule of opinion on ultimate issues was amended by the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 to add that no ex-
pert witness may offer testimony of the defendant's mental
state or condition which is an element of the crime charged or
of a defense thereto. 6 This amendment was intended "to
eliminate the confusing spectacle of competing expert wit-
nesses testifying to directly contradictory conclusions as to the
ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier of fact."'8 7 To-
gether with the amendment to Rule 704, insanity was made an
affirmative defense with the defendant having the burden of
proving insanity by clear and convincing evidence.88 Expert
testimony is now limited to "presenting and explaining their
diagnoses, such as whether the defendant had a severe mental
86. FED. R. EVID. 704 provides:
Opinion on Ultimate Issue
(a) Except as provided in subdivision b, testimony in the form of an opinion
or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether
the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are
matters for the trier offact alone.
Id. (emphasis added to show the additions to the preexisting Rule). Wisconsin's rele-
vant provision is identical to the pre-amendment Federal Rule. Wis. STAT. § 907.04
(1985-86).
87. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 230, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3182, 3412.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984). Section 20 provides for an insanity defense as follows:
(a) Affirmative defense. - It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under
any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting
the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was
unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.
Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
(b) Burden of proof. - The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of
insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. Section 20 was added by Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, § 402(a), 98 Stat. 2057
(1984). See generally supra note 57 and accompanying text. For a thorough treatment
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, see B. GEORGE, THE COMPREHEN-




disease or defect and what the characteristics of such disease
or defect, if any, may have been."'8 9 The last sentence of Rule
704(b), "[s]uch ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact
alone," 90 indicates the clear intention of the amendment.
The American Psychiatric Association advocates such a
limitation.91 Psychiatrists are medical experts, not legal ex-
perts. When they are requested to make leaps in logic by
drawing probable relationships between medical concepts and
legal and moral constructs, an impermissible joining of
medicine and law occurs. These leaps in logic confuse the
jury and ultimately do injustice to psychiatry and criminal de-
fendants. However, the psychiatrist must still be permitted to
testify fully as to the defendant's diagnosis, mental state, and
motivation at the time of the alleged act, but the legal determi-
89. See supra note 87.
90. FED. R. EVID. 704. See supra note 86 for the text of the rule.
91. The following statement is the position of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, a position which the legislature believes is a good basis for the limitation on expert
testimony in insanity cases.
[Ilt is clear that psychiatrists are experts in medicine, not the law. As such, it is
clear that the psychiatrist's first obligation and expertise in the courtroom is to
"do psychiatry," i.e., to present medical information and opinion about the de-
fendant's mental state and motivation and to explain in detail the reason for his
medical-psychiatric conclusions. When, however, "ultimate issue" questions are
formulated by the law and put to the expert witness who must then say "yea" or
"nay," then the expert witness is required to make a leap in logic. He no longer
addresses himself to medical concepts but instead must infer or intuit what is in
fact unspeakable, namely, the probable relationship between medical concepts
and legal or moral constructs such as free will. These impermissible leaps in
logic made by expert witnesses confuse the jury. Juries thus find themselves lis-
tening to conclusory and seemingly contradictory psychiatric testimony that de-
fendants are either "sane" or "insane" or that they do or do not meet the
relevant legal test for insanity. This state of affairs does considerable injustice to
psychiatry and, we believe, possibly to criminal defendants. In fact, in many
criminal insanity trials both prosecution and defense psychiatrists do agree about
the nature and even the extent of mental disorder exhibited by the defendant at
the time of the act.
Psychiatrists, of course, must be permitted to testify fully about the defend-
ant's diagnosis, mental state and motivation (in clinical and common sense
terms) at the time of the alleged act so as to permit the jury or judge to reach the
ultimate conclusion about which they and only they are expert. Determining
whether a criminal defendant was legally insane is a matter for legal fact-finders,
not for experts.
American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, p. 14 (as ap-
proved by the Board of Trustees) (December 1982), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3182, 3413 (footnote omitted).
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nations and conclusions as to insanity are to be left to the
factfinders.
The amendment "reflects a Congressional judgment that
the law has been too favorable to criminal defendants in per-
mitting them to fashion psychiatric defenses."192 Much of the
enthusiasm behind the change comes from a wave of criticism
that arose due to the attempted assassination of President
Ronald Reagan by John W. Hinckley, Jr., and Hinckley's suc-
cessful use of the insanity defense.93 This criticism arose
largely because "[t]he public believes that the insanity defense
is commonly relied upon and frequently successful. However,
insanity is rarely claimed and even more rarely successful." 94
B. Recent Court Interpretations
To date, there have been several court decisions addressing
the application of Rule 704(b) which concerns the scope of
this Comment. In United States v. Prickett,95 the United
States District Court of Ohio stated:
While under Rule 704(b) an expert may testify as to the de-
fendant's severe mental disease or defect and the characteris-
tics of such a condition, he or she is not to offer the jury a
conclusion as to whether said condition rendered the defend-
ant unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts. 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984). Rather,
under Rule 704(b), the latter is an "ultimate issue" to be
determined solely by the jury on the basis of the evidence
presented.96
In that case the defendant challenged the application of the
rule as being a violation of article I, section 9 of the United
92. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 691
(4th ed. 1986).
93. Id. See generally L. CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF
JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. (1984).
94. MacBain, supra note 8, at 7-8; see also id. nf. 29-30; S. HALLECK, THE MEN-
TALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER ch. 4 (1986) (prepared under contract for the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services).
95. 604 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 790 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1986). In this
case the defendant gave notice that he was going to rely on the insanity defense and
introduce expert testimony as to his mental condition at the time of the alleged crimes
as that testimony had a bearing upon guilt.
96. Id. at 409.
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States Constitution,97 which prohibits ex post facto98 laws.
The court viewed Rule 704(b) as having no effect upon the
crime charged nor on the quantity or degree of proof re-
quired.99 The court recognized the disadvantage to the de-
fendant's ability to introduce expert testimony, but held that
such a disadvantage stemming from a procedural change, as
the amendment to Rule 704 was determined to be, is not in
violation of the Constitution. 100 The court concluded:
[E]xpert testimony in the instant case may address the
mental illness of Defendant and the characteristics, if any, of
that mental illness. Expert testimony may not be intro-
duced, however, with respect to an expert's inferences or
opinion that, at the time of the alleged crimes, Defendant
was (1) sane; (2) insane; (3) lacked substantial capacity to
know the wrongfulness of his conduct; or (4)lacked substan-
tial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law which he is charged with violating.10 1
The court clearly admits the disadvantage to the defend-
ant. The court's conclusion as to the scope of the expert opin-
ion on ultimate issues makes this disadvantage more
profound. With insanity now being an affirmative defense and
the burden of proof being upon the defendant, the disadvan-
tage to the defendant is much greater in light of the limitation
on expert testimony. Conceivably, much of the permissible
testimony can be excluded if shown to create inferences by the
expert. With first-degree murder where the element of pre-
meditation must be proven,10 2 the exclusion of testimony as to
mental state may relieve the government of an element that it
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 provides: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed."
98. "Ex post facto" is defined as "(a)fter the fact; by an act or fact occurring after
some previous act or fact, and relating thereto." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 520 (5th
ed. 1979). An ex post facto law is "(a) law passed after the occurrence of a fact or
commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations
of such fact or deed." Id.; see also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).
99. Prickett, 604 F. Supp. at 410.
100. Id. See within the case the court's discussion of United States Supreme Court
decisions concerning procedural changes and ex post facto laws. Id. at 409-10.
101. Id. at 410-11.




must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a clear viola-
tion of In re Winship. 103
In the second case, United States v. Frisbee,1°4 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California
dealt chiefly with two issues; the first embraces the question of
whether Section 20105 of the United States Code limits admis-
sibility of evidence negating the existence of specific intent,
and the second issue addresses what the scope of Rule 704(b)
is in relation to negating specific intent and to the insanity
defense. The court found that section 20 was "not intended to
limit the admissibility of evidence negating the existence of
specific intent; rather, the court [found] that the section [was]
intended to narrowly restrict situations in which mental dis-
ease or defect will excuse an otherwise guilty defendant." 10 6
The court drew support for this finding from the intent of the
legislature through interpreting its legislative history. The
court also noted that "evidence used to negate the existence of
an element of the crime would not traditionally be considered
part of an affirmative defense because the evidence is used to
show innocence, as opposed to excuse or justify an otherwise
criminal act."' 07
In review of the scope of Rule 704(b), the court looked
again at legislative history and intent. The court suggests that
Congress recognized a distinction between evidence to negate
specific intent and evidence supporting a finding of insanity.10 8
If any distinction exists, it is a slight distinction. Both specific
intent and the issue of insanity are the ultimate issues to be
103. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See supra note 24 and accompanying text. They may
also be a violation of the burden and product shifting requirements. See infra text ac-
companying notes 136-51.
104. 623 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1985). The defendant, indicted for first-degree
murder, gave notice that he intended to introduce expert testimony relating to mental
disease or defect to negate specific intent. In both this and the Prickett case, the parties
were required to give notice of their intention to offer expert testimony relating to
mental disease or defect bearing upon the issue of guilt. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(b).
In Prickett, the defendant relied upon the insanity defense and the intended evidence
was to address specific intent and insanity. Prickett, 604 F. Supp. at 409. In Frisbee, the
defendant did not rely on the insanity defense and the proffered testimony was to negate
specific intent. Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. at 1219.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984). See supra note 88 for the text of the statute.
106. Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. at 1220.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1222.
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resolved by the jury. Rule 704(b) excludes expert opinion and
inference on mental state when it addresses an element of the
crime charged or a defense thereto. Supporting evidence such
as diagnoses and factual bases are admissible but their useful-
ness is questionable.
The court concluded that limited expert testimony con-
cerning requisite mental state is admissible in first-degree
murder trials. The limitation is that the testimony cannot be
in the form of opinion or inference on the ultimate issue of
specific intent. "Moreover, the court will instruct the jury
that the testimony may only be considered on the issue of
whether the defendant possessed the specific intent necessary
for a first-degree murder conviction"10 9 and not to consider
general intent necessary for a lesser crime.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Mest 110 also held that the retrospective use of Rule 704(b) was
not an ex post facto law.' Mest contended that the new en-
actment changed the degree or amount of testimony permitted
by the psychiatric expert. The court ruled that "[t]he change,
rather, is to whether either of these categories of witnesses can
instruct the trier of fact (in this instance, the jury) as to what
its findings should be on the factual questions about which the
witness could before and can now testify."' 2 What the court
missed by such an interpretation is that an opinion by a psy-
chiatric expert does not instruct the jury on how to find, but
rather provides them with the necessary information to make
an intelligent and rational decision. The jury receives less tes-
timony than it should.
In United States v. Windfelder, 1 3 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the application of Rule 704(b) to
a non-defendant and to the intent of that non-defendant.
"[T]hese opinions [by IRS experts] are not precluded by Rule
109. Id. at 1224.
110. 789 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir. 1986).
111. Id. at 1071-73. Mest appealed his conviction of first-degree murder. At trial,
when defense counsel attempted to ask a defense expert witness to give an opinion as to
Mest's ability to discern the wrongfulness of his actions and the capacity to conform his
behavior, the prosecution successfully objected to the admission of such opinion on the
basis of Rule 704(b). Id. at 1071.
112. Id. at 1072.
113. 790 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1986).
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704(b) because Lauretta Windfelder [was] not a defendant in
this case and her intent [was] not an element of the crimes
charged."'1 14 The court did, however, uphold Rule 704(b)
when they found error in the admission of testimony as to the
intent of Donald Windfelder to understate his income.1 1 5
In United States v. Alexander,11 6 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed challenges to Rule 704(b) from an
ex post facto1 17 argument and an equal protection argu-
ment.1 18 Alexander relied on the insanity defense against the
two count indictment for unlawful possession of stolen public
assistance checks. 1 9
The ex post facto argument was addressed and had the
same result as in Prickett and Mest. As for the equal protec-
tion argument, Alexander "contend[ed] that the statute [was]
unconstitutional because it limit[ed] her fundamental right to
present witnesses in her behalf and because there [were] no
compelling reasons to justify that limitation."'' 20  The court
saw this argument as falling more appropriately in due pro-
cess grounds, 121 but went on to discuss the compelling interest
which the court found to exist from interpreting the legislative
history.1 22 The court honestly attempted to adhere to the lib-
eral approach toward the admissibility of evidence relating to
the issue of insanity.
Defendants should be free, as Alexander was in this case,
to question expert witnesses extensively concerning their di-
agnosis of the defendant's mental condition, its symptoms
and treatment, and the effect such condition or illness may
have on a defendant's mental state. In addition, any relevant
medical records or reports should be admitted into evidence
114. Id. at 581. The defendant, Donald Windfelder, was convicted of understating
his income on his federal income tax return and of understating the estate of his de-
ceased aunt in preparing her estate tax return. Id. at 577-78.
115. Id. at 582.
116. 805 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1986).
117. Id. at 1461-62.
118. Id. at 1462-64.
119. Id. at 1460. Alexander had been given two checks to cash. She obtained false
identification cards by using the names on the checks and making up social security
numbers. Evidence was presented that showed that Alexander had suffered from, and
had been treated for, mental illness for several years. Id.
120. Id. at 1462.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1462-63.
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and the defendant should be allowed to question an expert
witness about them so they may be explained or interpreted
for the jury. Only in this manner may the jury be sufficiently
informed to make a decision on the defendant's legal sanity.
The operation of Rule 704(b) makes it essential that juries be
completely informed. A liberal approach towards the ad-
missibility of evidence relating to the issue of insanity en-
sures this.
12 3
The court called Alexander a "beneficiary of this liberal
approach." 124
The court's analysis was judicially honest but unfortu-
nately nearsighted. The information which they see as admis-
sible under Rule 704(b) is only facial. It merely touches the
surface, leaving the jury to formulate their own opinion based
upon insufficient evidence. In order to explain this type of evi-
dence, the expert invariably would need to express an opinion
on certain documents, theories and diagnosis. The combina-
tion of these pieces of evidence impact on an ultimate issue. It
is conceivable, then, that opinions related to this evidence
could be excluded under Rule 704(b). The lack of such expla-
nation and opinionated summation leaves the jury to speculate
as to the meaning of such evidence. The court in Alexander
may have thought that their reasoning was sound, but they
did not foresee the profound disadvantage in the practical ap-
plication of their decision.
C. California's Similar Statutory Provision
The State of California has a similar provision. Its evi-
dence rule is similar to the former Rule 704 on the federal
level and does not have the revised provision contained in
Rule 704(b). 121 However, a provision in the Penal Code oper-
ates much the same as Rule 704(b).1 26 A recent California
Court of Appeals decision discusses the relationship between
123. Id. at 1464.
124. Id.
125. CAL. EVID. CODE § 805 (West 1986). Section 805 provides: "Opinion on ulti-
mate issue: Testimony in the form of an opinion that is otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
Id. This provision is substantially similar to the former FED. R. EVID. 704 and to Wis.
STAT. § 907.04 (1985-86), except for the elimination of the word "inference." See supra
note 86.
126. CAL. PENAL CODE § 29 (West 1986). Section 29 provides:
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these two statutory provisions. 12 7 The defendant contended
that section 29, along with sections 25 and 28 of the Penal
Code, violated her constitutional right to effectively present a
defense by preventing her from entering evidence showing
that she did not have the requisite specific intent for first-de-
gree murder. Section 29 was upheld by a previous decision as
a "legitimate legislative [determination] on the admissibility of
certain classes of evidence [which did] not deprive a defendant
of his or her right to present a defense." 28 The defendant also
argued that Evidence Code section 805129 is controlling over
Penal Code section 29130 and therefore expert testimony
reaching ultimate issues of mental state should be admissible.
The court rejected that argument holding that the more spe-
cific provision, Penal Code section 29, is controlling over the
more general provision, Evidence Code section 805. 31 The
court also concluded that section 29 "[does] not contravene
any constitutional due process rights of defendant to use wit-
nesses or to equal protection. Likewise, [it does] not relieve
the prosecution of its burden of proof."' 132
As set forth below, Rule 704(b) and the People v.
Whitler 133 decision, in conjunction with the related statutory
provisions, violate constitutional due process. Likewise, the
Steele v. State13 4 decision in Wisconsin, although the state
does not have similar statutory restraints, operates to deprive
the defendant of his or her constitutional rights.
Mental state; restriction on expert testimony; determined by trier of fact.
In the guilt phase of a criminal action, any expert testifying about a defend-
ant's mental illness, mental disorder, or mental defect shall not testify as to
whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states, which
include, but are not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice afore-
thought, for the crimes charged. The question as to whether the defendant had
or did not have the required mental states shall be decided by the trier of fact.
Id. Notice the similarities between this provision and the amendment to Rule 704. See
supra note 86 for the text of the amendment.
127. People v. Whitler, 171 Cal. App. 3d 337, 214 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1985).
128. Id. at _, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 613; see also People v. Jackson, 152 Cal. App. 3d
961, 199 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1984).
129. See supra note 125.
130. See supra note 126.
131. Whitler, 171 Cal. App. 3d at -, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
132. Id. at -, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
133. 171 Cal. App. 3d 337, 214 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1985).
134. 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).
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IV. CONCERNS, COMMENTS AND PROPOSALS
The limited scope of the admissibility of psychiatric expert
testimony on the issue of specific intent has become constitu-
tionally unacceptable. Where specific intent is an element of
the crime charged or of a defense thereto, the restriction upon
psychiatric expert testimony turns the rebuttable presumption
of sanity at the time of the occurrence of the alleged offense
into a conclusive presumption. This conclusive presumption
is not created expressly (except for California's Penal Code
§ 1026),13' but is created in the mind of the juror through the
lack of information provided on the issue of intent and the
instruction to the jury concerning the presumption that the
accused was sane and intended the natural consequence of his
or her actions. This conclusive presumption also has the effect
of relieving the government of an element of the crime which
it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These court deci-
sions and evidentiary rules are production-shifting devices
that are subject to constitutional due process review. The
shifting of the burden of production to the defense and then
strictly limiting its ability to enter evidence, is tantamount to a
conclusive presumption and, therefore, violative of the defend-
ant's due process rights.
A. Presumptions Generally
A presumption 136 is a relationship between sets of facts:
basic facts and presumed facts. A conclusive presumption ex-
ists if the presumed fact exists as a matter of law due to the
establishment of the basic facts. 137 A rebuttable presumption
is a rule of law which requires the presumed fact to be found
once the basic fact is established, unless the judge rules that
the evidence offered against the presumed fact is sufficient for
such a showing. 138
135. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
136. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 71, §§ 342-47.
137. A conclusive presumption is technically not a presumption at all because it
does not shift a burden of production or persuasion. It is seen as a fiction that masks
substantive law and the court will not entertain evidence as to its rebuttal.
138. Two theories exist as to the operation of rebuttable presumptions. The first is
"Thayer's Bursting Bubble" theory, adopted by FED. R. EVID. 301 and by CAL. EVID.
CODE § 604 (West 1986). Under this theory, when the basic fact is established, the
presumed fact must be taken as established unless and until the opponent introduces
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Recent United States Supreme Court decisions 139 have res-
urrected old terminology concerning presumptions in criminal
cases. I40 A mandatory presumption "operates to shift at least
the burden of production. It tells the trier of fact that it must
find the presumed fact upon proof of the basic fact, 'at least
unless the defendant has come forward with some evidence to
rebut the presumed connection between the two facts.' "141 A
permissive presumption "allows, but does not require, the
trier of fact to infer the presumed fact from proof of the basic
facts.' 42 Both mandatory and permissive presumptions on
the criminal level operate like a rebuttable presumption.
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact by the
trier of fact. Upon the introduction of such evidence, the presumption is overcome and
disappears (the bubble bursts) without regard to whether it is believed or not. The
second theory is the "Morgan Approach" which is adopted in Wisconsin by Wis. STAT.
§ 903.01 (1985-86). Under this theory, when the basic fact is established, the jury is
instructed that it must find the presumed fact unless and until the opponent persuades
the jury that the non-existence of the presumed fact is more probably true than not. For
a more comprehensive discussion of these theories see M. GRAHAM, supra note 68, at
§ 301.6. See infra note 139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the operation of
presumptions in criminal cases.
139. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); County Court of Ulster
County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
140. For a discussion of presumptions in criminal cases in Wisconsin, see Genova
v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 595, 283 N.W.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1979). In Genova, the court of
appeals held:
[A] "criminal presumption" is not a presumption at all but simply a permissive
inference, that is, a finding of fact that may be grounded upon circumstantial
evidence. Thus, a permissive inference is judicially-approved logic that endorses
evidence of a basic fact as circumstantially sufficient to permit, but not compel,
an inferred fact which must be established if the finder of fact's affirmative ulti-
mate conclusion is to be upheld.
Id. at 607, 283 N.W.2d at 488. Whether courts label this procedural tool a presumption
or an inference, its operation still pivots upon some evidence that establishes the pre-
sumed or inferred fact. That evidence can be direct as to the presumed or inferred fact's
existence or it can be circumstantially based upon the basic fact or the evidence taken as
a whole. Evidence must exist for the "logical relationship which establishes the suffi-
ciency of the circumstantial evidence of an inferred fact," or for a presumption to be
"grounded upon logical relationship or policy, or both, of the basic fact to the presumed
fact." Id. at 607-08, 283 N.W.2d at 489. A logical relationship must be formed with
some evidence to support it. See also Wis. STAT. § 903.03 (1985-86).
For a more detailed discussion of burdens of proof and presumption in the criminal
setting, see Allen & DeGrazia, The Constitutional Requirement of Proof Beyond Reason-
able Doubt in Criminal Cases: A Comment Upon Incipient Chaos in the Lower Courts,
20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (1982-83); Graham, Presumptions - More Than You Ever
Wanted to Know and Yet Were Too Disinterested to Ask, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 431 (1981).
141. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 71, § 346, at 988 (quoting Allen, 442 U.S. at 157).
142. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 71, § 346, at 988.
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As a result of County Court of Ulster County v. Allen 143
and Sandstrom v. Montana,144 presumptions operating within
a criminal case are subject to the test developed by those
cases. This test is best stated in the Cleary edition of McCor-
mick on Evidence:
Mandatory presumptions, at least those which operate to
place a burden of persuasion on the defendant, will be rigidly
scrutinized in accordance with a test which requires that a
rational juror could find the presumed fact beyond a reason-
able doubt from the basic facts. In making this assessment,
the Court will not consider the other evidence in the
case.... [P]ermissive presumptions will be constitutionally
acceptable if there is a rational way, considering all of the
evidence in the case, that the jury could draw the inference
suggested by the presumption. Whether a presumption is
mandatory or permissive is to be gleaned from an analysis of
the instructions to the jury.'45
However, the presumption being mandatory or permissible is
of little consequence because the ability to rebut the presump-
tion of sanity is so extremely limited that the presumption's
nature turns from rebuttable to conclusive. The presump-
tion's classification theoretically may be rebuttable, but in its
practical application it acts like a conclusive presumption.
The jury is not given enough evidence or testimony to support
a finding against the presumption. Therefore, the inference is
created in the mind of the juror that the presumption of san-
ity, upon which the jurors were instructed at the outset, still
exists. The presumption's existence insures a finding for
sanity.
B. Production-Shifting and the Effect on the Jury
The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed the issue of pro-
duction-shifting devices in Muller v. State. 146 Muller was de-
143. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
144. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
145. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 71, § 347, at 997.
146. 94 Wis. 2d 450, 289 N.W.2d 570 (1980).
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cided in light of Ulster and Sandstrom.147 The court reviewed
the instruction given to the jury on intent to kill. 148 The re-
view consisted of the wording of the instruction and, more
crucially, the effect upon a reasonable juror. The reasonable
juror was seen as not being able to interpret the instruction as
shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant or estab-
lishing a conclusive presumption. 149
Taking this "reasonable juror" concept, in relation to the
procedural devices of the psychiatric expert testimony exclu-
sion provided for in Rule 704(b), an assumption can be drawn
that the reasonable juror could misinterpret any instruction as
shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant or creating
a conclusive presumption. The effect is a directed verdict on
the element of intent due to production (or persuasion) in the
mind of the juror. As a practical matter, the juror will be
looking for some evidence to show him or her that the pre-
sumption no longer exists. The incompleteness of the evi-
dence will suggest to the juror that there is not enough
evidence to refute specific intent, regardless of the instruction
that it is only a presumption.
The issue of intent remains an issue for litigation. Testi-
mony is given and the jury is permitted to draw inferences
from the circumstances surrounding the incident and from lay
147. See Note, After Sandstrom: The Constitutionality of Presumptions that Shift
the Burden of Production, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 519. The above Note is a comprehensive
look at this Wisconsin decision in light of the decisions in Ulster and Sandstrom.
The following articles are excellent works on the issues of presumptions and the role
of psychiatry in the courtroom. See generally Allen, More on Constitutional Process-of-
Proof Problems in Criminal Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1795 (1980-81); Allen, Rationality
and Accuracy in the Criminal Process: A Discordant Note on the Harmonizing of the
Justices' Views on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 1147 (1983); Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A
Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321 (1980-
81); Dickey, Remington & Schultz, Law, Trial Judges, and the Psychiatric Witness -
Reflections on How a Change in Legal Doctrine Has Been Implemented in Wisconsin, 3
INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 331 (1980) [hereinafter Dickey]; Nesson, Rationality, Pre-
sumptions and Judicial Comment: A Response to Professor Allen, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1574 (1980-8 1); Risinger, Substance and Procedure Revisited With Some Afterthoughts
on the Constitutional Problems of Irrebuttable Presumptions, 30 UCLA L. REV. 189
(1982-83).
148. Muller, 94 Wis. 2d at 468-73, 289 N.W.2d at 579-81. The instruction has
since been revised to prevent constitutional infirmities. See Wis. Jury Instructions-
Criminal 1100 (1986).
149. Muller, 94 Wis. 2d at 477-78, 289 N.W.2d at 584.
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testimony. Expert testimony is admissible but, as previously
shown, on a very limited scale. The expert can speak to the
facts surrounding her diagnosis and can explain the medical
basis for the diagnosis and the characteristics of the diagnosed
mental illness. However, the jury is left to draw its own infer-
ences and conclusions as to the true meaning of the psychia-
trist's testimony. The lay jurors are given raw data and are
told to come to conclusions as to insanity, conclusions which
the psychiatric expert has been highly educated to make. To
permit the jury to draw an inference from incomplete and
often confusing evidence is wrong.
Granted, the jury is permitted to draw any inference it sees
fit. However, a better reasoned approach would be to have the
expert bring all the facts, data and observations together to an
ultimate conclusion that would be more helpful to the jury,
creating more assistance to the trier of fact.150 It is better to
educate the jury with complete testimony than to leave the
important issues of specific intent and insanity open to the un-
fettered discretion of the jurors in drawing their inferences. It
is argued that expert opinions on ultimate issues invade the
province of the jury. The justification to abolish the ultimate
issue rule still remains today. The jury is free to disregard the
opinions of experts.151 It is better to provide the jury with the
opinion, permit it to resolve the differences in opinion,152 and
properly instruct the jury of its rights concerning expert opin-
ion, than it is to provide the jury with insufficient information
to rebut a presumption.
C. Restricted Psychiatric Expert Testimony and the
Bifurcated Trial
The effect of limited psychiatric expert testimony on the
bifurcated trial system is much more profound than in the sin-
gle phase trial. In California, the statutory conclusive pre-
sumption 5 3 operates as the device depriving the defendant of
150. "The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit
them when helpful to the trier of fact." FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note.
151. See M. GRAHAM, supra note 68, § 704.1. "Wigmore dismissed the common
law ultimate issue rule as 'a mere bit of empty rhetoric.'" Id. (quoting J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1920, at 18 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978)).
152. See supra text accompanying note 84.
153. See supra notes 14 and 25 and accompanying text.
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the opportunity to enter a defense to the element of intent. In
Wisconsin, the Steele v. State decision is that device. 154 Each
system separates the issues of guilt and insanity. The guilt
phase is conducted with knowledge of the separate insanity
phase. This suggests to the jury that the mental state of the
defendant is less critical in the guilt phase. With this illogical
suggestion, in conjunction with the lack or insufficiency of tes-
timony concerning intent, the juror is given little to use to
rebut a presumption of intention on the part of the accused to
commit the criminal act. A guilty verdict is then a determina-
tion by the jury that the act was committed without an assur-
ance that the element of specific intent was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt by the state. A specific intent crime, such as
first-degree murder, requires proof of that element. The result
is that the criminal justice system is finding defendants guilty
of a crime when an element of that crime is missing.
In the insanity phase, the jury makes a determination of
the issue of insanity without regard to the guilt phase or the
guilty verdict. Therefore, the issue of intent, an issue properly
reserved for the guilt phase, is never thoroughly or properly
addressed. As Professor Wallace MacBain points out, "the
sanity or responsibility of the defendant is an integral part of
guilt determination. This must be so if the criminal justice
system is to be minimally fair and just."15  Professor
MacBain's discussion of doctrinal confusion is also very en-
lightening on this point.156 The concepts of "mens rea," "re-
sponsibility," and "guilt" work together to suggest that "mens
rea should be used in its general sense which assumes that
there may be no culpability or guilt without responsibility."1 57
154. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
155. MacBain, supra note 8, at 14.
156. Id. at 10-16.
157. Id. at 16. Wisconsin views the accused guilty of the criminal act but not re-
sponsible for his or her criminal conduct. See Wis. STAT. § 971.15 (1985-86). When a
state makes the mental state (specific intent) an element of the crime, that element must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If that mental element is not present, there is no
guilt and likewise no responsibility. It is the better view to hold mental disease or defect
as to that mental element to be crucial in guilt determination and ultimate responsibil-
ity, than it is to view mental disease or defect as encompassing only responsibility. The
criminal act may still have occurred, but without that required mental element, that
mens rea, there is no guilt. See MacBain, supra note 8, at 10-16. See generally Annota-
tion, Modern Status of Test of Criminal Responsibility - Federal Cases, 56 A.L.R. Fed.
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He ultimately concludes that sanity is a necessary element in
guilt determination.
Since specific intent concerns a mental purpose or a
mental state, 158 the improper treatment of the element of spe-
cific intent causes insanity to play little part in guilt determi-
nation. Not permitting the jury to properly address the issue
of intent by limiting the defense's ability to rebut a presump-
tion of sanity relieves the state of its burden as to that element.
Such a sequence is in violation of due process. 59
D. Misplaced Fear and Misdirected Confusion
The major fear in the legal community surrounding psy-
chiatric expert testimony is confusion itself. The fear that the
testimony of these experts will confuse the jury has led to the
exclusion of this evidence. Some of this confusion emanates
from the nature of the testimony itself. If the issues surround-
ing mental state, intent and psyche in general were all crystal
clear and easily answered, these issues would not pose a great
problem and the need for expert testimony would be minimal.
Unfortunately, this is not the case.1 60 Some experts attempt to
force medical concepts into legal molds and vice versa. This
causes confusion. However, this can be controlled.
Much of the confusion-causing factors come not from the
expert but from the attorneys, judges, and the system in gen-
eral. Attorneys question their witness or the opposition's wit-
326 (1982); Annotation, Modern Status of Test of Criminal Responsibility - State Cases,
9 A.L.R.4th 526 (1981).
158. See supra note 58.
159. It should be noted that this restriction on the admissibility of psychiatric ex-
pert testimony also hinders the prosecution. The state wishes to enter evidence to prove
specific intent and to disprove insanity. The restraints upon the submission of such
testimony can make the state's burden difficult to meet. However, with the effect of the
presumptions, the nature of the juror, and the nature of the bifurcated trial system, the
defendant is the party more egregiously affected. When the liberty and societal stigma
of the accused is at stake, the state must shoulder the heavier burden.
160. See generally Dickey, supra note 147. It is a given that there is controversy
within the psychiatric profession and that psychiatric theories lend themselves to an
inner sense of confusion. But this is why the evidence must be supported by explana-
tions and opinions. One author has written extensively concerning this debate which
centers around the confusion within the psychiatric profession. For a discussion of this
dilemma, see generally T. SZASZ, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY 98 (1970); T. SZASZ, LAW,
LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); T. SZASZ, PRIMARY VALUES AND MAJOR CON-
TENTIONS ch. 6 (1983); T. SzAsz, THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: PSYCHIATRY IN THE
MIRROR OF CURRENT EVENTS chs. 1 & 3 (1984).
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ness in a manner that fosters confusion. 161 The questioning
permits the witness to answer too freely and to interject, too
often, testimony that causes confusion or raises unnecessary
collateral issues. The attorney should conduct the direct or
cross-examination of the witness with pointed questions that
call for clear and concise answers. Testimony in this fashion
will provide the trier of fact with the pertinent information
without giving it useless and confusing statements.
The judge should monitor the admission of the testimony
with strict scrutiny. Objections that arise from the question-
ing should be considered with an open mind as to the value of
the testimony, keeping in mind the goals of expert testimony,
i.e., to assist the trier of fact. Any offer of proof as to a con-
tested issue should be conducted out of the hearing range of
the jury. Possibly a pretrial conference, a motion in limine, or
a recess at the time the expert is to take the stand, for the
purpose of setting parameters for the submission of the testi-
mony, would eliminate some of the confusion and reinforce in
the minds of both the attorneys and the judge that the testi-
mony is valuable, but must be handled with care. An instruc-
tion to the jury, either at the start of the trial or prior to the
submission of testimony, concerning the testimony and their
rights as jurors in connection with that testimony, would be
helpful. It may be more appropriate to phrase the instruction
in general terms so as not to place in the minds of the jurors
the impression that this testimony is more important than
other testimony. Such an instruction may not be possible and
may be too prejudicial, but if a suitable agreement can be
reached between the state and the defense as to its wording,
the instruction may have the benefit of eliminating some
confusion.
The system itself can cause some degree of confusion.
This confusion stems mainly from incomplete testimony that
the evidentiary rules and case law advocate. The testimony is
limited to facts, data and superficial diagnoses. Because the
expert cannot express an opinion or inference that would
bring some meaning to the admissible evidence, the jury is left
to speculate as to the meaning of this evidence and draw its
161. Dickey, supra note 147, at 333-38 (examples of the line of questioning of an
expert in leading Wisconsin cases).
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own inferences. The better course to follow is to admit com-
petent and relevant opinion testimony in each phase of the
trial where the issue is raised. If the evidence is admitted
under proper questioning and under a watchful, scrutinizing
eye of the judge, the jury will be permitted to make more in-
formed judgments, rather than battle with incomplete, confia-
sion-causing evidence. Having the jury resolve the differences
of opinion between experts is more judicially sound than let-
ting the jury draw inferences from insufficient evidence. The
other alternative would be to exclude all psychiatric expert
testimony. However, this alternative is much too drastic in
light of the immense value of this critically important testi-
mony. Such unsupported inferences should not be permitted
when they determine ultimate facts (which constitute an ele-
ment of the crime charged or a defense thereto).
Psychiatric expert testimony should be admissible. The
jury is free to reject expert opinion or give it any weight it sees
fit. Therefore, testimony that is competent and relevant
should be admitted even though it embraces an ultimate issue.
The proposals below should assist in making the testimony
competent and relevant. The justifications, although their
merit is minimal, are not enough to keep the testimony out or
to deprive the defendant of his due process right to properly
enter his defense. The difficulties with the testimony and psy-
chiatry in general should then go to the weight of the evi-
dence, not admissibility.
E. Proposals
The following proposals address first the psychiatric ex-
pert and second the bifurcated trial system. If viewed as a
starting point for a review of these aspects of Wisconsin's
criminal justice system, they will hopefully ignite some pro-
ductive debates.
1. The Expert and the Testimony
The major difficulty courts seem to have concerning psy-
chiatric expert witnesses is assuring that they are properly
qualified to testify and assuring that their testimony is reason-
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ably based upon their qualifications. In State v. Dalton,162 the
"psychiatrist's qualifications as an expert were conceded."' 163
However, the court excluded his opinion testimony on
whether Dalton had the intent to kill because the opinion was
not based on scientific knowledge and the testimony would
not assist the trier of fact. 164 Therefore, even though the ex-
pert was qualified, the testimony he was offering was not com-
petent. If the expert had properly examined the defendant,
formulated his opinion on the basis of scientific, technical or
other specialized knowledge, and then presented his opinion
supported by credible information, the testimony would have
been admissible.
In State v. Flattum,165 the court prohibited expert testi-
mony which made a causal link between the defendant's
mental health history and a lack of intent. A psychiatrist
would be allowed to give his opinion on the defendant's capac-
ity to form the requisite intent to kill if he was "properly qual-
ified as an expert on the effects of intoxication ... [but] he or
she may do so only if that opinion is based solely on the de-
fendant's voluntary intoxicated condition."1 66 This suggests
that a properly qualified expert who makes an examination
and bases his or her opinion on his or her qualifications and
the examination, will be permitted to offer that opinion to the
trier of fact.
In State v. Repp, 167 the court followed its holding in Flat-
turn by excluding causally linked testimony of mental health
history and lack of capacity to form the requisite criminal in-
tent, and permitting properly qualified and based expert testi-
mony. 68 The court also held that the exclusion of testimony
did not prevent the defendant from offering a permitted de-
fense, but rather, was a "function of defense counsel's failure
to adequately introduce either lay evidence or properly quali-
162. 98 Wis. 2d 725, 298 N.W.2d 398 (Ct. App. 1980).
163. Id. at 731, 298 N.W.2d at 400.
164. Id. at 730-31, 298 N.W.2d at 400.
165. 122 Wis. 2d 282, 361 N.W.2d 705 (1985).
166. Id. at 293, 361 N.W.2d at 711.
167. 122 Wis. 2d 246, 362 N.W.2d 415 (1985). Both Repp and Flattum were de-
cided on the same day. They also were argued on the same day.
168. Id. at 254, 362 N.W.2d at 418.
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fled psychiatric evidence in admissible form to raise" the per-
mitted defense. 169
These three cases indicate that Wisconsin courts are will-
ing to admit psychiatric expert testimony that is relevant and
competent. The first step is to properly qualify the witness.
For example, if the issue deals with intoxication, the witness
must be educated and experienced in the area of intoxication.
If there are multiple issues it is conceivable that an expert on
each issue will be needed. With multiple issues, however, the
risk of confusion is greater and the possibility of an objection
under section 904.03170 is more likely. It is then advisable to
choose the argument with the strongest probability of success.
The best criteria to use for assuring that the expert will meet
the qualification is a strict adherence to the standard set out in
section 907.02.171
The second step is to educate the witness. Educating the
witness should take place before the defendant is examined.
The witness should be informed as to what the present state of
the law is concerning intent and insanity. If the prosecution
and the defense can stipulate as to the definition given to these
concepts, things will be much easier. If no agreement can be
reached (which is more likely), then the witness should be
given a broad definition and informed of the arguments for
and against that definition. Remember that psychiatrists are
highly educated people. It is not inconceivable that they have
the ability to understand legal concepts. The idea is not to
have medical and legal concepts joined together, 72 but to have
the psychiatrist, who is examining the defendant, conscious of
what the law says these concepts mean. The ultimate determi-
nation of intent, guilt, responsibility and insanity are legally
and not scientifically based. A forensic psychiatrist would be
169. Id. at 259, 362 N.W.2d at 420.
170. Wis. STAT. § 904.03 (1985-86). See supra note 75 for the text of the statute.
The probative value of the evidence weighed against the propensity for confusion is the
basic review criterion.
171. Wis. STAT. § 907.02 (1985-86). See supra note 71 for the text of the statute.
172. See generally M. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELA-
TIONSHIP (1984); Comment, Legal and Psychiatric Concepts and the Use of Psychiatric
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 73 CAL. L. REv. 411 (1985); Poythress, Book Review,




an ideal candidate for an expert witness. 7 3 The expert's in-
sight and experience as to both the legal and scientific aspects
of the issues involved may lend more credibility and compe-
tency to the testimony. If the expert is required to address the
legal aspect of the examination, an offer of proof can be made
to show that the expert has been "educated" in the legal defi-
nitions of the issues, and the examination and determination
have been made with these in mind. The forensic psychiatrist
should therefore be able to offer relevant and competent opin-
ion testimony concerning the legal aspects, as well as the sci-
entific aspects, of intent and insanity.
It should be remembered that the attorney offering the tes-
timony as evidence should not tell the expert what should be
found. Otherwise, the expert's credibility will be destroyed by
a good cross-examination. It is rather an educational process
which makes the witness more competent and useful.
The third step is to perform the examination of the witness
with great care. Instruct the witness to answer only the ques-
tions asked with pointed, concise answers in terminology that
will not confuse the jury. Fashion the questions around the
qualifications of the expert to prevent the submission of testi-
mony which is beyond the scope of the expert's examination
and expertise. Such testimony, which is beyond the scope lim-
itations, will be subject to exclusion under Flattum and Repp.
These steps are of a practical nature. Although not revo-
lutionary, they need to be stressed due to the increased diffi-
culties in dealing with psychiatric expert witnesses. If
followed, these steps should lead to more competent and use-
ful testimony that does not cause great confusion. Much of
the confusion has stemmed from the system itself. Much of
this confusion can be eliminated by adhering to the above
proposals.
2. The Bifurcated System
The basic ideals associated with a bifurcated trial system
are commendable. The difficulty concerns its operation. The
173. See generally Smith, The Art of Forensic Psychiatry: A Montage of Murder
Cases, 29 J. FORENSIC Sci. 209 (1984); Tanay, Forensic Psychiatry and Justice, 62




defendant is being found guilty in the first phase of the trial
when all the elements are not being properly addressed. The
right of the defendant to have the state prove each element of
the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt is viciated when
specific intent is given such presumptive treatment. The the-
ory of presumption of innocence, being not really a presump-
tion but merely another way of stating the government's
burden of proof,174 no longer has any validity. The element of
specific intent is, in effect, conclusively presumed to be present
when the act is yet to be proven. The second stage then ad-
dresses insanity. Under the present system, the purpose of
this stage is basically to determine the guilty party's disposi-
tion; if sane, the defendant is imprisoned and if insane,
institutionalized.
The two alternatives suggested in the discussion which fol-
lows operate under the conclusion reached by Professor
MacBain and assumed here, namely that sanity is a necessary
element in guilt determination. 175 Therefore, the defendant
should not be found guilty in the first phase if found to be
insane in the second phase.
The guilt phase could be better termed and described as an
"act determination" phase. In this phase each element of the
crime, except specific intent, will be addressed by a special
verdict. The jury will return a verdict of "proven" or "not
proven" as to each element. If an element is adjudged to be
"not proven," then the defendant is not guilty unless the ele-
ments "proven" amount to a lesser included offense.
All the elements being "proven," the second phase be-
comes necessary. In this, the guilt phase, the element of spe-
cific intent would be addressed along with the issue of
insanity. This would focus the attention on mental state and
eliminate confusion of the issues. Again, special verdicts as to
each possibility would be appropriate. The instruction should
include statements on the meaning of each outcome in terms
of guilt. By finding in such a way, the outcome will be guilty
or not guilty. If intent is found and insanity is proven, then
the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity (mental dis-
174. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 71, § 342, at 967-68; see also supra note 24.
175. See MacBain, supra note 8, at 16; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 71,
§ 346, at 988 (quoting Allen, 442 U.S. at 157).
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ease or defect). If intent is found and insanity is not proven,
then the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. If intent is
not found, insanity is proven, and the remaining elements
amount to a lesser included offense, then the defendant is not
guilty by reason of insanity. Finally, if specific intent is not
found and insanity is not proven, then the defendant may be
guilty of a lesser included offense if the "proven" elements
amount to that. 76
By associating specific intent and insanity so closely, the
jury will be able to review the state's burden of proving be-
yond a reasonable doubt as to intent with the defense's burden
of proving insanity as an affirmative defense by a lesser quan-
tum of proof. Less confusion may arise from this close associ-
ation than by splitting the issue up in the present scheme of a
sequential order of proof. Granted, intent and insanity are
two distinct issues, but the general relationship of state of
mind or mental purpose calls for a review under one umbrella
of proof rather than split into two proofs.
The second alternative would be to have the first phase
become the insanity phase. If the defendant is adjudicated to
be sane, then the second phase would become a basic guilt
phase that operates like a regular single-phase trial. In the
guilt phase the issue of specific intent must be fully addressed
as discussed in this Comment. If the defendant is adjudicated
insane in the first phase, the second phase would be an "act
determination" phase where it is assured that the accused is
the person who committed the acts of the crime charged and
therefore not responsible because of the defendant's insanity.
It is crucial to all of these suggestions that the instructions
to the jury concerning experts, intent, phases, elements of the
crime and the burden of proof be as clear and as helpful as
possible. The better the instructions the more effective these
proposals will be.
V. CONCLUSION
If the government is going to make the mental state of the
accused an essential element of the crime charged or of a de-
176. This second phase may be termed the "guilt determination" phase. The find-
ings by the jury in this phase will determine the guilt of the defendant of the crime
charged or possibly a lesser included offense.
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fense thereto, then fundamental fairness requires that the de-
fendant be permitted to fully address these issues. Evidentiary
rules, procedural rules and court decisions have eroded this
fairness which is basic to our system of jurisprudence. The
attempts to rationalize and crystalize legal issues by these
rules and decisions have failed. The endeavors to alleviate
confusion-causing factors have been misdirected. More con-
fusion is caused by the system and its operatives than by the
expert witness.
Psychiatrists, as expert witnesses in a criminal trial, should
be given the opportunity to fully express their findings and
their opinions regarding their findings.1 77 Where presump-
tions exist as to elements that the psychiatrists are qualified to
address, they should address those elements in their entirety
rather than providing bare, incomplete testimony. The expert
witness is there to assist the trier of fact.
The bifurcated trial system, although enacted with the in-
tention to eliminate confusion, has created confusion and in-
justice when it operates in conjunction with the restriction on
expert opinion testimony speaking to ultimate issues. This
confusion and injustice has been elevated to the point of being
unconstitutional.
Criminal intent and insanity are very controversial areas
of the law. The bifurcated trial system and expert opinion tes-
timony on ultimate issues add to this controversy by being
constitutionally incompatible. If our criminal justice system is
to operate under the notion that with guilt there must be san-
ity and responsibility, the present system must be reevaluated.
The bifurcated trial system can work if the submission of evi-
dence is permitted but properly controlled. The possible dep-
rivations of liberty and stigma attachments are too great to
permit the system to continue along the present course.
KEVIN T. SMITH
177. See Tuchler, supra note 173, at 248.
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